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A Case of Statutory Interpretation:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Prohibit Retaliation?
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This ease revolves around
competing theories of
statutory interpretation.
The issue is whether
42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits
retaliation for asserting
rights under the statute.
By its terms, the statute
guarantees to all persons
the same rights as white
citizens to "'make and
enforce contracts." The
explicit language of the













Can an employee bring a claim
under 42 U.8.C. § 1981 if he is ter-
minated from employment because
he has complained about racial dis-
crimination at work?
Can the language of the statute be
interpreted to include retaliation
claims?
FACTS
Hedrick Humphries, an African
American, was in associate manager
of a Cracker Barrel restaurant from
1999-2001. Initially, he received
excellent performance evaluations,
merit raises, and bonuses.
Circumstances changed, however,
when a new store manager took
over. lumphries alleged that the
new manager made racially deroga-
tory remarks and handed out disci-
pline in a racially discriminatory
manner. On several occasions,
lHumphries complained to the dis-
trict manager about the store main-
ager's behavior. Shortly thereafter,
Ilumphries was fired for allegedly
leaving the store safe unlocked
over night.
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Subsequently, lhunphries filed a
lawsuit alleging discrimination
based on race and retaliation tinder
both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Cracker Barrel filed a motion to dis-
miss the Title VII claim on the basis
that the lawsuit was untimely filed.
The district court granted the
inlotion and dismissed Ilumphries'
Title VII claims. lumpthries v.
(BOCS West, Inc., 343 FSupp.2d
670 (N.D. t11. 2004). Humphries did
not appeal that decision.
Thereafter, Cracker Barrel filed a
motion for summary judgment seek-
ing dismissal of Iumphries's
remaining claims tnder § 1981. The
district court granted summary
judgment on 1lumphries's claim that
his discharge was motivated by
either race or retaliation, holding
that he failed to produce sufficient
evidence from which a trier of fact
could presume that race or retalia-
tion was a motive for his termina-
tion. Ihumphries v. CBOC'S West,
Inc., 392 F. Supp.2d 1047 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
Htumphries appealed the grant of
summary judgment. In response,
Cracker Barrel, for the first time,
raised the issue that retaliation
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claims are not cognizable under
§ 1981. In reviewing the district
court's deceision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided to consider the legal issue
raised by Cracker Barrel iii addition
to determining whether Hlumphries
had produced sufficient evidenee to
survive the motion for stmmary
,judgment. lumplirics v. 6130CS
West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir.
2007).
The Seventh Circuit held that the
Supreme Court's decision in
Sullivan v. Little ltntinM, Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), supports
the conclusion that § 1981 covers
retaliation elails. In Sullivan, a
nonprofit corporation that operated
a colnnunity park for residents
refused to allow a white homeowner
to assign his membership to an
African American. When the home-
owner protested, lie was expelled
from tile corporation. Tile home-
owner sued under § 1981 and 42
U.S.C. § 1982. Tile Supreille Court
ruled that lie had standing to bring a
claim under § 1982 because he was
the victim of retaliation for asserting
the rights of the African American to
"purchase, lease, sell, hold and con-
vev real ... property" on the same
basis as white citizens (which are
the rights protected b § 1982). The
Seventh Circuit indicated that since
§ 1981 and § 1982 share a common
genesis in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, the\, can be read cotermi-
nou0sly. Indeed, the Sullivan Court
emphasized the "broad and sweep-
ing nature of tile protection meant
to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866" iii reaching its
conclusion that § 1982 prohibited
retaliation.
The Seventh Circuit noted that after
Sullivan the consensus among the
circuit courts was that § 1981 should
be read broadly to prohibit diserinii-
nation in all aspects of the employ-
meit relationship, both pre- and
post-formation, including retaliation.
Ilowever, in 1989 the Supreme
Court decided Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
The Patterson Court narrowed the
reach of § 1981, holding that the
protection of the right to make and
enforce contracts only applies to
discriminatory conduct related to
the formation of a contract and does
not extend to post-formation dis-
erimination. It specifically does not
apply to claims of harassment,
which was the subject of the plain-
tiff's lawsuit in that ease. After
Patterson, most of the circuits held
that retaliation elaims were not cog-
nizable under § 1981 since such
claims involved post-formation con-
duct, which tile court in Patterson
specifically found not within the
reach of § 1981.
Congress responded to Patterson (as
well as several other recently decid-
ed Supreme Court cases involving
Title VII) by enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, whieh amended,
among other things, § 1981, to
define the term "make and enforce
contracts" as including the perfor-
mance, modification, termination,
and enjoyment of all benefits and
terms and conditions of the contrac-
tual relationship. The Seventh
Circuit noted that the legislative
history of the amendment indicated
that Congress intended retaliation
to be included within the new defin-
ition. Thereafter, several circuit
courts of appeals determined, as a
result of the 1991 amendments,
that retaliation claims were now
covered tnder § 1981. Agreeing
with the wveight of authority, the
Seventh Circuit determined that
the plain text of § 1981, as amend-
ed, covers retaliatory discharge
from employment.
The Seventh Circuit also noted that
this result is consistent with the
recent Supreme Court decision in
,Jackson v. Birmingliam Board of'
Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005). In
Jackson the Supreme Court was
required to decide if Title IX of the
1972 Education Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited a
school board from retaliating against
a basketball coach who complained
about sex discrimination in the
school's athletic program. Title IX
prohibits sex diserimination in
education programs operated b
federal-fund recipients, but does not
expressly prohibit retaliation. In
deciding that the prohibition on dis-
crimination necessarily includes
retaliation, the Jackson Court relied
upon its prior decision in Sullivcan.
The Court noted that Sullivan held
that the general prohibition against
discrimination contained in § 1982
covered retaliation even though that
specific term is not contained in the
statutory language. Furthermore,
the ,Jackson Court indicated that
tile objective of preventing discrimi-
nation would be impeded if retalia-
tion were not prohibited.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected
the argument that since Title VII
prohibits retaliation there is no
need to interpret § 1981 as also cov-
ering retaliation. Congress has been
aware of the overlap and parallel
status of Title VII and § 1981 and
has consistently indicated its intent
to maintain these two causes of
action as separate, distinet and
independent. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that § 1981
prohibits retaliation.
In reviewing the district Court's
grant of sumnary judgment, the
Seventh Circuit agreed that
mIlphries failed to effectively sub-
stantiate his elaim that his termina-
tion was because of his race and so
affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment ill favor of Cracker Barrel on
that aspect of the case. With regard
to the retaliation claim, however,
the Seventh Circuit found that
Humphries had provided sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie
ease that his termination from
employment was in retaliation for
(Continued on Puge 206)
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his complaints about racial discrimi-
nation and reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment
on the retaliation claim.
The Supreme Court granted
Cracker Barrel's petition for a writ
of certiorari on the question of
whether a retaliation claim is cog-
nizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
128 S.Ct. 30 (2007).
CASE ANALYSIS
In its argument, the petitioner
addresses the plain text of the
statute, congressional intent, legisla-
tive history, Supreme Court prece-
dent, and public policy.
Petitioner Cracker Barrel initially
notes that the statute does not
include the word retaliation. The
equal right to make and enforce
contracts protected by the statute is
decidedly different from a prohibi-
tion against retaliation; thus, the
right protected by the statute can-
not fairly by interpreted to mean a
totally different concept. Section
1981 by its terms prohibits discrim-
ination based on status (i.e., race)
but not discrimination based on
conduct (i.e., complaints about race
discrimination).
This distinction between the right
to equal treatment and the prohibi-
tion of retaliation is recognized in
Title VII, which contains separate
provisions dealing with the two con-
cepts and explicitly spells out the
prohibition against retaliation.
Cracker Barrel argues that because
the plain text of § 1981 is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need for
the Court to determine legislative
intent. However, given that both the
lower court and respondents rely, in
part, on legislative intent and histo-
ry, the petitioner addresses these
principles.
W\hen Congress intends to prohibit
retaliation, it expressly uses that
language, as evidenced by the many
federal statutes that contain explicit
anti-retaliation elauses, e.g., Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the Family
Medical Leave Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act. But neither
the original nor the amended 1991
version of § 1981 include an anti-
retaliation clause.
Over the last 30 years, the petition-
er reasons, Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding statutory interpre-
tation has evolved and Congress,
when amending § 1981 in 1991, was
aware of that evolution. In the
19 60s, the Court had adopted an
approach of broadly construing gen-
erally worded statutes, supplement-
ing the statutory language to make
the statute more effective. In recent
years, however, the Court has aban-
doned that approach, adhering more
closely to the statutory text. In par-
ticular, in Pc4tterson, the Court
expressly stated that where the
statutory language was clear, it
would not rely on Congress's subjec-
tive intent to supplement the lan-
guage. Thus, when Congress amend-
ed § 1981 in response to Patterson,
it was well aware of the Court's
emphasis on the plain text of the
statute. If, therefore, Congress had
intended § 1981 to cover retaliation,
it knew it would have to include the
specific prohibition in the text of
the statute. It did not do so.
A well-accepted principle of statuto-
ry construction holds that a statute
specifically focused on a particular
issue controls over a more generally
worded statute. Title VII specifically
addresses retaliation and provides
an administrative procedure for
enforcement. An expansive reading
of § 1981 to include retaliation
would undermine the administrative
and conciliative procedures con-
tained in Title VII, allowing a plain-
tiff to do an end run around both
Title VII's statute of limitations and
its mandated conciliation process.
According to Cracker Barrel, the
lower court's use of legislative histo-
ry in reaching its conclusion was
inappropriate because the statutory
language is clear, thereby obviating
the need for an examination of the
statute's history. Furthermore, the
court relied on a single line from a
House committee report that listed
retaliation as one of the acts of dis-
crimination covered by the 1991
amendment to § 1981. An examina-
tion of the Senate committee report,
however, contains no similar men-
tion of retaliation. There is no basis
for relying on the House report as
evidence of congressional intent
rather than the Senate report. That
is why the plain text of the statute
controls.
The petitioner also contends that
the lower court's reliance on
Sullivan and Jackson was mis-
placed. When deciding Sullivan, the
Supreme Court was applying a norm
of statutory construction in which it
supplemented the plain language of
statutes to make them more effec-
tive. This norm has subsequently
been disavowed by the Court and
replaced with the principle that
courts should base their interpreta-
tions on a close adherence to statu-
tory text. In deciding Jackson, the
Court was interpreting a statute
enacted in 1972 against a backdrop
of statutory interpretation where
the norm was to read statutory lan-
guage expansively. The ,Jckson
Court noted that this timing provid-
ed a context for interpreting Title
IX. Congress would have expected
that the Court would expansively
read the general language it used in
enacting that statute. Thus, the fact
that Title IX did not expressly use
the term retaliation but instead
used the more general term dis-
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cflelrinltion was not an inpediment
to finding that the term discrimina-
tiou included the prohibition of
retaliation.
On the other hand, the 1991
amendment to § 1981 was enacted
against the backdrop of a statutory
construction norm requiring close
adherence to the text of the statute.
Congress was equally aware of that
jurisprudence and knew that it
wvould need to be explicit in its use
of statntorv language if it wanted to
include a prohibition of retaliation.
Moreover, Title IX expressly pro-
hibits discrimination, a term not
found in § 1981. The Jackson Court
indicated that the term discrimina-
tion was sufficiently ambiguous that
it could be interpreted to include
the concept of retaliation.
Finally, in neither the Sullivan nor
the Jackson ease was the Court
confronted with the problem of rec-
onciling two overlapping statutes,
which problem arises in the current
ease given the overlap between Title
VII and § 1981.
Petitioner's final argument is based
on public policy concerns. An inter-
pretation of § 1981 that includes
retaliation would undermine the
public policy behind Title VII. A
plaintiff may enforce his or her
rights under § 1981 by directly fil-
ing a claim in court within four
years of the incident. Under Title
VII, however, before a claimant can
file a lawsuit, he or she must first
submit the claim to the EEOC
where the agency has the opportu-
nity to conciliate the claim and
obviate the need for litigation.
Bypassing the EEOC deprives the
parties of the opportunity to resolve
the claim without the cost of litiga-
tion and places added burdens on
the judiciary. Additionally, Congress
capped the time limit for filing a
Title VII claim at 300 days, whereas
a § 1981 claimant enjoys a four-year
statute of limitations. Since § 1981
covers only race and certain ethnic-
based discrimination claims but not
claims based on sex, it is inherently
unequal to allow a plaintiff with a
retaliation claim based on a coin-
plaint about race discrimination up
to four years to file a lawsuit while
requiring a plaintiff with a retalia-
tion claim based on a complaint
about sex discrimination to file
within 300 days. In his argument,
respondent also relies on the plain
text of the statute, Supreme Court
precedent, and legislative intent.
Humphries emphasizes that the lan-
guage of § 1981 encompasses more
than merely an anti-discrimination
mandate. It seeks to ensure not only
equal treatment based on status
(i.e., race) but also equal treatment
based on conduct (i.e., "make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence. ... "). The text guar-
antees enumerated rights to all citi-
zens. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the existence of a
right includes not only protection
against direct impairment of the
right but also protection against
reprisal for exercising the right.
The backdrop against which
Congress enacted the original
§ 1981 in 1866 was replete with
instances of reprisals and attacks
against former slaves who had exer-
cised their rights. In seeking to
ensure that former slaves had the
right to make and enforce contracts,
Congress obviously intended to
protect them against reprisals for
doing so.
Mr. lumphries' act of complaining
about race discrimination is a right
specifically guaranteed by the text
of § 1981. Such a complaint can be
seen either as an exercise of a right
to enjoy a benefit of a contract or as
an exercise of the right to enforce
the contract. Thus, firing
Hlunphries for complaining consti-
tuted a direct interference with his
rights under § 1981.
Cracker Barrel maintained an
"open-door policy" that it required
employees to use to report incidents
of discrimination or harassment.
This policy constituted a benefit of
the contractual employment rela-
tionship. tlumphries used that bene-
fit to make his complaint. According
to IHumphries, when Cracker Barrel
fired him because he was a black
worker exercising his right to that
benefit, it violated the express terms
of § 1981, which requires that black
workers have the same right to the
benefit of the contract as white
workers.
Under Illinois law (which applies to
IHumphries's employment, as his job
was located in Illinois), a clear and
specific policy statement disseminat-
ed to employees who continue to
work after receiving the policy cre-
ates an enforceable contract right.
Thus Cracker Barrel's anti-discrimi-
nation policy and open-door policy
themselves constituted terms of its
contract with Ilumphries. Ilis com-
plaint, therefore, constituted
enforcement of his contract, and by
firing him for enforcing his contract,
Cracker Barrel violated the specific
terms of § 1981, which prohibits dis-
crimination in enforcing contracts.
By its terms § 1981 forbids race-
based retaliation. It prohibits an
employer from handing out the ben-
efits of the contractual relationship
based on race. Thus (looking at the
statutory language alone), while an
employer could fire all workers who
complained about race discrimina-
tion, an employer could not fire
black workers who made such a
complaint while not firing white
workers who made the same
complaint.
The Supreme Court's decisions in
Sullivan and Jlackson compel a
(Contiztwd on PCgC 208)
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finding that § 1981 prohibits retalia-
tion. Sullivan held that the enjoy-
ment of the right to purchase, sell,
and convey real property protected
by § 1982 included a prohibition
against retaliation. Section 1981
should be interpreted consistently
with § 1982. Both statutes originat-
ed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and share the same purpose and
history. For this reason the Court
has often looked to § 1982 in inter-
preting § 1981. Thus the right to
make and enforce contracts protect-
ed by § 1981 should also be inter-
preted to include retaliation.
The vitality of Sullivan was affirmed
bv Juckson, which held that Title IX
prohibits retaliation. As the Court
recognized in .hackson, protection
from retaliation is necessary to pro-
tect the rights guaranteed in Title
IX. Similarly, protection against
retaliation is necessary to ensure
protection of the rights guaranteed
in § 1981. While it is true that some
§ 1981 plaintiffs receive protection
against retaliation under the anti-
retaliation clause in Title VII, not all
§ 1981 plaintiffs would be covered.
Employers with fewer than 15
employees are not covered by Title
VII but do fall within the purview of
§ 1981. Similarly, independent con-
tractors are not protected by Title
VII but are entitled to the rights
guaranteed tinder § 1981.
The overlap between Title VJJ and
§ 1981 does not require a narrow
interpretation of § 1981. The Court
has consistently recognized that
Congress intended for Title VII and
§ 1981 to coexist as separate and
independent sources of rights and
remedies, regardless of any overlap.
Congress reconfirmed its intent that
Title VII not displace § 1981 in
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991
which amended both Title VII and
§ 1981. In the amendment, it placed
a cap on damages available tinder
Title VII while expressly providing
that such a cap did not apply to
claims under § 1981.
When it amended § 1981 in 1991,
Congress also restored the protec-
tion against retaliation that had
been unanimously recognized by
the lower courts prior to the
JPatterson decision. Prior to
Patterson, the lower courts had
interpreted the "right to make and
enforce contracts" as encompassing
conduct that occurs after the forma-
tion of the contract, including retali-
ation. When the Patterson Court
read this language more narrowly,
as only applying to the initial forma-
tion of a contract, most subsequent
claims of retaliation were moot
since they generally arise in the
context of current employees com-
plaining about discrimination in the
post-formation stage of the contract.
When Congress amended § 1981 to
include post-fornmation conduct, it
was restoring the status quo ante,
which had included retaliatory con-
duet. Thus, Congress did not need
to specifically mention retaliation.
SIGNIFICANCE
On one level, this case is of great
concern to employers whose liabili-
tv for retaliation will be greatly
expanded if the statute is interpret-
ed to include retaliation claims. As
noted by the parties, although Title
VII clearly prohibits employer retal-
iation against employees attempting
to enforce their right to be free from
discrimination in the workplace,
allowing such claims under § 1981
will result in smaller employers,
currently exempt from Title VII,
being subject to liability for retalia-
tory action, as well as causing all
employers to face increased mone-
tary damages for such action as
there is no cap on damages tinder
§ 1981 as there is tinder Title VII.
From the plaintiff's perspective, a
broad reading of the statute will
benefit not only employees, but
also independent contractors who
receive no protection tinder Title VII
but are within the purview of
§ 1981. A narrow reading exeluding
retaliation claims will place at least
some plaintiffs in the precarious
position of asserting their rights
tinder fear of losing their jobs.
On a different level, however, this
ease has the potential for implica-
tions bevond both the employment
context and § 1981. The parties
have laid out competing theories of
statutory interpretation to support
their arguments, and how the Court
responds to, and applies, those theo-
ries may provide guidance to how
the Court will resolve disagreements
over the interpretation of other
statutes in future eases.
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